Issue: 2021/Vol.31/No.1, Pages 97-121


Izabella Stach, Jacek Mercik

Full paper (PDF)    RePEC

Cite as: I. Stach, J. Mercik. Measurement of control power in corporate networks. Operations Research and Decisions 2021: 31(1), 97-121. DOI 10.37190/ord210106

This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods for measuring indirect control in complex corporate shareholding networks. The methods use power indices to estimate the direct and indirect control in shareholding structures. Some of these methods only estimate the control power of investors (firms without shareholdings), and only a few measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks (which means investors and stock companies). None of them takes measuring the importance of mutual connections (edges in the networks) into consideration; thus we focus in particular on an extension of these methods in this paper to measure both the control-power of the firms involved in complex shareholding structures (represented by nodes in networks) and the importance (power) of linkages between the firms as elements of a whole corporate shareholding network. More precisely, we apply our approaches to a theoretical example of a corporate network. Moreover, we continue the considerations about reasonable properties for indirect control measurement. Some ideas of new properties are proposed. The paper also provides a brief review of the literature concerning the topic.

Keywords: corporate networks, indirect control, simple games, power indices

Received: 9 September 2020    Accepted: 15 March 2021