Issue: 2016/Vol.26/No.2, Pages 7-30


Cesarino Bertini, Jacek Mercik, Izabella Stach

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Cite as: C. Bertini, J. Mercik, I. Stach. Indirect control and power. Operations Research and Decisions 2016: 26(2), 7-30. DOI 10.5277/ord160202

To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex problem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.

Keywords: game theory, indirect control, corporations, power indice

Received: 2 May 2016    Accepted: 24 June 2016