Issue: 2013/Vol.23/No.1, Pages 75-86
ANALYSIS OF THE VOTING METHOD USED IN THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
Honorata Sosnowska
Cite as: H. Sosnowska. Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank. Operations Research and Decisions 2013: 23(1), 75-86. DOI 10.5277/ord130106
Abstract
Game theoreticians usually deal with standard voting methods such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some complicated non-standard voting methods are used. In this paper the voting method and rotation scheme have been presented used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. We present game theoretical approaches for analyzing this method and different methods of computing the Shapley value for games connected with voting under such rotation schemes.
Keywords: voting, European Central Bank, Shapley value
Received: Accepted: