Issue: 2011/Vol.21/No.3-4, Pages 5-19
QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF VETO POWER
Chessa Michela
, Vito Fragnelli
Cite as: C. Michela, V. Fragnelli. Quantitative evaluation of veto power. Operations Research and Decisions 2011: 21(3-4), 5-19. DOI 10.5277/ord1203-0401
Abstract
The decisiveness index and the loose protectionism index for a single player have been intro- duced, starting from the decisiveness and the loose protectionism indices for a collective decision- making mechanism defined by Carreras. Attention was mainly focused on the latter index, being pro- posed as a quantitative measure of the power of veto of each agent. According to this index, a veto player has veto power equal to one, while each other player has a fractional power according to her/his likelihood of blocking a given proposal. Such an index coincides with the expected payoff at the Bayesian equilibrium of a suitable Bayesian game, which illustrates the non-cooperative point of view of a decision-making mechanism.
Keywords: veto power, indices, quantitative measure, Bayesian game
Received: Accepted: