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## Generic Networks of Votings

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#### Abstract

In this paper we propose the method for analysing the voting results of given kind of competition. Suppose that a competition is given, with the Borda Count used as a voting method. For every such competition there is a weighted network (called *voting network*) associated in a natural way. Namely, the nodes set corresponds to jurors and link weights correspond to correlation coefficients of voting results of adequate jurors. However, all main correlation coefficients, as well as related metrics considered as distance on rankings, do not distinguish between changes in high places in the competition and changes in low places. We propose a new distance on rankings that allows to observe such distinction. We analyse the results of 2016 International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition by comparing the properties of its voting network to the statistical properties of *generic networks of votes*. These generic networks are randomly chosen according to precisely given probability measure on the space of all possible votings of a single juror (i.e. the space of permutations of contestants set). We use these methods to confirm the hypothesis that jurors of 2016 International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competitional Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition are randomly chosen according to precisely given probability measure on the space of all possible votings of a single juror (i.e. the space of permutations of contestants set). We use these methods to confirm the hypothesis that jurors of 2016 International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition were far away from being consistent.

Keywords: generic network, Lehmer norm, Borda count

## 1. Introduction

There were many controversies concerning the results of the 15<sup>th</sup> International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition (2016). Both Gazeta Wyborcza, one of the most popular Polish newspapers, see [6], and Ruch Muzyczny, the most significant Polish music journal, see [12], raised the possibility that the jurors of the most recent Wieniawski Competition formed cliques.

The results of the 2016 Wieniawski Competition were analysed in [26], where they were compared to the results of  $16^{\text{th}}$  (2010) and  $17^{\text{th}}$  (2015) International Chopin Piano Competitions. The metods of network theory, see for example [11], [18], [19] and [28], were applied to compare the voting results of the three aforementioned music competitions. For these three competitions weighted networks, see [10],  $W^{2016}$ ,  $C^{2010}$  and  $C^{2015}$  were created and some numerical properties of these network were compared.

Received 5 March 2025, accepted 21 June 2025, published online 21 June 2025 ISSN 2391-6060 (Online)/© 2025 Authors

This is not yet the definitive version of the paper. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article.

Weighted networks are used in biology, see [10], in stock markets analysis, see [4] and [7], as well as in the studies on the structural and functional organisation of the human brain, see [22]. Usually, the weight of link  $l_{st}$  connecting nodes s and t are given by some kind of a correlation coefficient related to some rankings or processes asocciated to nodes. In [26], the weights  $w_{st}$  of links  $l_{st}$  were given by  $w_{st} = \tau_{st}$ , where  $\tau_{st}$  were *Kendall's*  $\tau$  *coefficients*, see [13], [14] and [1], of the voting results of jurors  $J_s$ and  $J_t$ . For stock market networks, this correlation was measured by the *Pearson correlation coefficient*, see [3].

In the case of rankings, many measures of disarray has been studied in the literature. In the case of the *Borda count* method of voting, see [9], [20] and [21] for a description of this method, votes can be regarded as elements of permutation groups  $S_k$  (k is the number of contestants). The best known measures of dissarray are *Kendall's*  $\tau$  *correlation coefficient* and *Spearman's*  $\rho$  *correlation coefficient*, see [27], as well as metric measures such as *Kendall distance*, *Spearman distance*, *Hamming distance* and *Footrule distance*, see [5] and [24]. The weighted versions of the Kendall distance and the Footrule distance were considered in [15] and [23].

The classical measure of dissarray mentioned above has such a property that changing the first two positions in the Borda ranking has the same impact on the measure as changing the last two positions. On the other hand, the weighted generalisations of the Kendall distance and the Footrule distance proposed in [15] fail to be metrics (for some choices of weights).

This paper is inspired (partially) by some questions that arised during discussions on [26], where similar methods were used. There are two main differences comparing to [26]. First one - measures of disarray used. In [26] *Kendall's*  $\tau$  *coefficient* is used, whereas in this paper we use the *Lehmer factorial norm* (see [29]). This is a symmetric, right-invariant norm on the permutation group  $S_n$  satisfying the triangle inequality and thus determining the metric on  $S_n$ . Additionally, this norm allows for distinguishing changes in the first positions and in the last positions of rankings. The second difference (and a new insight) is that in this paper we determine some probability measure on the space of all possible (Borda) votings (of 11 jurors and 7 contenstants) in such a way, that some statistic properties of networks of votes for such a probability measure fit best properties of network of votings related to the result of the 15<sup>th</sup> International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition. The form of this probability measure in a certain sense "confirms" the controversies concerning the results of the 15<sup>th</sup> International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition.

This article is organised in the following way. In Section 2, we present basic definitions concernig permutation groups and we set the notations used in this paper. We also recall the definition and basic properties of the Lehmer factorial norm. In Section 3, we analyse the results of the 15<sup>th</sup> International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition using the network approach. In Section 4, we describe the procedure of generating random networks of votings. These *generic networks* are used later in Section 5 for determining the model of generating random networks with properties best fitting the properties of the network related to the results of the 15<sup>th</sup> International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition. Section 6 contains conclusions and open questions related to the subject of these studies.

#### 2. Basic definitions and notations, the Lehmer norm

In this section, we present some basic definitions used in this paper, and we set some notations. We also refer to the definition and basic properties of the Lehmer factorial norm.

For a natural number n > 0, by [n] we denote the set  $\{1, 2, ..., n\}$  and by  $S_n$  – the group of all permutations of [n]. Permutation  $\sigma \in S_n$  is denoted by

$$\sigma = (\sigma(1), \sigma(2), \dots, \sigma(n)).$$

In particular  $\varepsilon_n = (1, 2, ..., n)$  denotes the identity permutation.

By  $\sigma^{-1}$ , we denote the inverse permutation to  $\sigma$ , and by  $\sigma\tau$  – the composition of  $\sigma$  and  $\tau$ , defined by  $(\sigma\tau)(i) = \sigma(\tau(i))$  for i = 1, 2, ..., n. By  $\bar{\sigma}$ , we denote the reverse permutation to  $\sigma$  given by  $\bar{\sigma}(i) = \sigma(n+1-i)$  for i = 1, 2, ..., n.

For s = 1, 2, ..., n - 1 let

$$\alpha_n^s = (1, 2, \dots, s - 1, s + 1, s, s + 2, \dots, n),$$

so  $\alpha_n^s$  is adjacent transposition, (s, s + 1) in the cycle notation.

For permutation  $\sigma \in S_n$ , its Lehmer code  $lc(\sigma)$ , see [16], [17] and [8], is defined by

$$lc(\sigma) = [c_1(\sigma), c_2(\sigma), \dots, c_n(\sigma)]$$

where numbers  $c_i(\sigma)$  are given by

$$c_i(\sigma) = |\{j \in [n] : j > i \text{ and } \sigma(j) < \sigma(i)\}|$$

for i = 1, 2, ..., n.

Definition 1 (Definition 3.4 in [29]). Let  $\sigma \in S_n$  be a permutation with the Lehmer code

$$\operatorname{lc}(\sigma) = [c_1(\sigma), c_2(\sigma), \dots, c_n(\sigma)].$$

Lehmer factorial norm  $\mathcal{LF}_2: S_n \to \mathbb{N}$  is given by

$$\mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma) = \sum_{i=1}^n \left[ 2^{n-i} - 2^{n-i-c_i(\sigma)} \right].$$

In the next theorem, we refer to some basic properties of the Lehmer norm.

Theorem 1 (Theorem 3.6 in [29]). Norm  $\mathcal{LF}_2$  satisfies the following:

- (i)  $\mathcal{LF}_2(\varepsilon_n) = 0$  is minimal and  $\varepsilon_n$  is the only permutation with this property.
- (ii)  $\mathcal{LF}_2(\bar{\varepsilon}_n) = 2^n (n+1)$  is maximal and  $\bar{\varepsilon}_n$  is the only permutation with this property.
- (iii)  $\mathcal{LF}_2(\alpha_n^s) = 2^{n-1-s}$  for s = 1, 2, ..., n-1, and therefore

$$\mathcal{LF}_2(\alpha_n^1) > \mathcal{LF}_2(\alpha_n^2) > \ldots > \mathcal{LF}_2(\alpha_n^{n-1}).$$

(iv)  $\mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma) = \mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma^{-1})$  for all  $\sigma \in S_n$ .

(v)  $\mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma\tau) \leq \mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma) + \mathcal{LF}_2(\tau)$  for all  $\sigma, \tau \in S_n$ .

Note that properties (i), (iv) and (v) imply that  $\mathcal{LF}_2$  determines the metric on  $S_n$ . Indeed, the function  $d_{\mathrm{L}}: S_n \times S_n \to \mathbb{N}$  given by

$$d_{\rm L}(\sigma,\tau) = \mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma\tau^{-1})$$

is a metric. We call it the Lehmer distance.

Note also that  $d_L$ , considered as a distance on rankings, distinguishes changes in high places in the competitions from changes in low places.

# 3. Results of the 15<sup>th</sup> Wieniawski Competition. A network approach

In this section, we analyse the results of the  $15^{\text{th}}$  International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition using the network approach.

In this paper, we consider simply undirected networks. A (simply undirected) network is a pair N = (N(N), L(N)) consisting of set N(N) of nodes, usually finite, and set L(N) of links, where every link  $l \in L(N)$  is a subset of N(N) consisting of two different elements. Networks are often called graphs in the literature, nodes and links - vertices and edges, sites and bonds, or actors and ties, respectively. Let N be a network, and suppose that there is a map  $w : L(N) \to \mathbb{R}$ . Triple (N(N), L(N), w) is called a weighted network.

A good introduction to the concept of networks can be found in [18] and [19], whereas [28] contains the same ideas described in the language of graphs. Methods of weighted networks can be found in [10].

There were 11 jurors and 7 contestants in the final stage of the 15<sup>th</sup> Wieniawski Competition. The jurors rated the contestants in the final according to the Reverse Borda count: 1 point for the best and 7 points for the worst. The winner was the contenstant with the lower sum of points. The results are presented in Table 1.

 1											
	J1	J2	J3	J4	J5	J6	J7	J8	J9	J10	J11
Α	7	3	2	7	7	4	3	7	7	7	7
В	4	7	7	2	2	7	7	2	5	6	5
С	5	5	5	3	6	6	5	5	6	1	6
D	3	6	4	5	1	5	4	4	3	5	1
E	1	4	6	1	3	3	6	3	4	3	4
F	6	2	1	6	4	2	1	6	1	2	2
G	2	1	3	4	5	1	2	1	2	4	3


Table 1. Final results of the 15<sup>th</sup> International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition

We define the weighted network  $N(\mathbf{W})$  in the following way. The nodes set of  $N(\mathbf{W})$  corresponds to the jurors set  $\{J_i : i \in [11]\}$ , whereas the links set consists of all links  $\{J_s, J_t : s \neq t \in [11]\}$ . For link  $l_{st}$  connecting  $J_s$  with  $J_t$ , we assign weight  $w(l_{st}) = w_{st}$ , where

$$w_{st} = \mathcal{LF}_2(\alpha_s \alpha_t^{-1}).$$

Here  $\alpha_s$  and  $\alpha_t$  denote the votes of jurors  $J_s$  and  $J_t$ , respectively. In particular, for i = 1, 2, ..., 7,  $\alpha_s(i)$  is the number of points given to the *i*-th contestant by juror  $J_s$ . The similar holds for juror  $J_t$ . Note that  $\alpha_s$  and  $\alpha_t$  can be considered as elements of  $S_7$ . Network  $N(\mathbf{W})$  is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Network  $N(\mathbf{W})$ , green – small weights, red – large weights



For p = 1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.0, we create networks  $N(\mathbf{W})_p$  removing from  $N(\mathbf{W})$  links  $l_{st}$  with weights satisfying the condition

 $w(l_{st}) > p \cdot \max \left\{ \mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma) : \sigma \in S_7 \right\} = p \cdot 120.$ 

Note that for p decreasing,  $N(\mathbf{W})_p$  contains links connecting jurors voting more and more consistently. They will be used later in Section 5. Networks  $N(\mathbf{W})_{0.4}$ ,  $N(\mathbf{W})_{0.3}$ ,  $N(\mathbf{W})_{0.2}$  and  $N(\mathbf{W})_{0.1}$  are presented in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Voting networks based on the final results of the 15<sup>th</sup> International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition

**a**). Network 
$$N(\mathbf{W})_{0.4}$$
 **b**). Network  $N(\mathbf{W})_{0.3}$ 

For better understanding of the consistency of jurors' voting, for

s = 0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.45, 0.50, we create networks  $N(\mathbf{W})^s$  removing from  $N(\mathbf{W})$  links  $l_{st}$ , with weights satisfying the condition

$$|w(l_{st}) - 0.5 \cdot \max \{ \mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma) : \sigma \in S_7 \}| < s \cdot \max \{ \mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma) : \sigma \in S_7 \}, \text{ i.e.}$$
$$|w(l_{st}) - 60| < s \cdot 120.$$

Note that when s is increasing, then  $N(\mathbf{W})^s$  contains only the links connecting jurors that vote more and more consistently and more and more inconsistently, since we remove the links connecting jurors voting independently. Networks  $N(\mathbf{W})^{0.2}$ ,  $N(\mathbf{W})^{0.25}$ ,  $N(\mathbf{W})^{0.3}$ ,  $N(\mathbf{W})^{0.45}$ ,  $N(\mathbf{W})^{0.45}$ are presented in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Voting networks based on the final results of the 15<sup>th</sup> International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition

Note, that the method of removing links used here is very similar to the method of selecting decision variables in econometrics (Bartosiewicz method), see [2]. On the other hand, we are not able to use Bartosiewicz method strictly, since we analyse the votes of all jurors, which are equally important.

## 4. Generic networks of votes

In this section, we describe the procedure of generating random networks of votings. These *generic networks* will be used later in Section 5 for determining the model of generating random networks with properties best fitting the properties of network  $N(\mathbf{W})$ . We determine this best fitting model to check the hypothesis that jurors of 15<sup>th</sup> International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition voted controversially. Namely, their votings were neither consistent nor random.

Consider the space of all possible votings of a single juror in W - the final stage of the 15<sup>th</sup> Wieniawski Competition. This space can be seen as  $S_7$ . Let  $\mathbb{P}$  denote the probability measure on  $S_7$ . We consider the measures of the form

$$\mathbb{P} = \mathbb{P}(d, \alpha, \beta) = \alpha \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_1} + \beta \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_2} + (1 - \alpha - \beta) \mathbb{P}_{\text{uniform}}$$

where:

- $\alpha, \beta \in [0, 1]$  satisfy the condition  $\alpha + \beta \leq 1$ ,
- $d \in [0, 1]$ ,
- $\mathbb{P}_{uniform}$  is the uniform probability measure on space  $S_7$ ,

•  $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma_1}$  and  $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma_2}$  are the Dirac probability measures on  $S_7$  centred at permutations  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$  respectively, where  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$  are randomly chosen in such a way that they satisfy the condition

$$\mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma_1\sigma_2^{-1}) \simeq d \cdot \max{\{\mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma) : \sigma \in S_7\}}.$$

 $\mathbb{P}$  defined in this way is a convex combination of  $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma_1}$ ,  $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma_2}$  and  $\mathbb{P}_{uniform}$ . The condition bonding  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$  is a metric analogue of the condition for the correlation coefficient of  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$ . In this paper, we consider  $\alpha, \beta = 0, 0.05, 0.1, \ldots, 0.95, 1$  and  $d = 0, 0.1, \ldots, 0.9, 1$ . Set  $N_{max} = \max \{\mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma) : \sigma \in S_7\}$ . The notation  $\simeq$  means that  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$  are randomly chosen from all possible pairs of permutations satisfying condition  $\mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma_1\sigma_2^{-1}) \in [d \cdot N_{max} - 0.05 \cdot N_{max}, d \cdot N_{max} + 0.05 \cdot N_{max}]$ .

The procedure for generating the random network of votings is as follows:

- (i) choose a repetition number  $j = 1, 2, \ldots, 100$ ,
- (ii) choose  $d = 0, 0.1, \dots, 0.9, 1$ ,
- (iii) randomly choose such  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$  that  $\mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma_1\sigma_2^{-1}) \simeq d \cdot N_{\max}$ ,
- (iv) choose such  $\alpha, \beta = 0, 0.05, 0.1, \dots, 0.95, 1$  that  $\alpha + \beta \leq 1$ ,
- (v) for every s = 1, 2, ..., 11 randomly, according to  $\mathbb{P} = \alpha \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_1} + \beta \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_2} + (1 \alpha \beta) \mathbb{P}_{\text{uniform}}$ , choose  $\alpha_n^s \in S_7$  this is the vote of juror  $J_s$ ,
- (vi) create weighted network  $N(d, \alpha, \beta, j)$  according to the procedure described in Section 3,

(vii) for p = 1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.0, create network  $N(d, \alpha, \beta, j)_p$ .

### 5. Fitting the parameters

In this section, we determine such parameters d,  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  that the statistical properties of a family of networks  $\{N(d, \alpha, \beta, j) : j = 1, 2, ..., 100\}$  fit best the properties of the network  $N(\mathbf{W})$ .

According to the constructions of networks  $N(\mathbf{W})_p$ , their connected components, as p decreases, correspond to groups of jurors voting in a more and more consistent way. Table 2 contains the number of connected components of networks  $N(\mathbf{W})_p$ .

treshold parameter p	components number
1	1
0.9	1
0.8	1
0.7	1
0.6	2
0.5	2
0.4	3
0.3	7
0.2	8
0.1	10
0	11

Table 2. 1	Number of	connected	components	of networks	$N(\mathbf{W})_p$
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Let C(N) denote the number of connected components of network N. We determine the numbers  $d_e^{\min}$ ,  $d_m^{\min}$ ,  $d_e^{\max}$  and  $d_m^{\max}$  given by

$$d_{\rm e}^{\rm min} = \min_{d,\alpha,\beta} \left\{ \sqrt{\sum_{p} \left( C\left(N(\mathbf{W})_{p}\right) - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{100} C(N(d,\alpha,\beta,j)_{p})}{100} \right)^{2}} \right\},$$

$$d_{\rm m}^{\rm min} = \min_{d,\alpha,\beta} \left\{ \sum_{p} \left| C\left(N(\mathbf{W})_{p}\right) - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{100} C(N(d,\alpha,\beta,j)_{p})}{100} \right| \right\},$$

$$d_{\rm e}^{\rm max} = \max_{d,\alpha,\beta} \left\{ \sqrt{\sum_{p} \left( C\left(N(\mathbf{W})_{p}\right) - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{100} C(N(d,\alpha,\beta,j)_{p})}{100} \right)^{2}} \right\} \text{ and }$$

$$d_{\rm m}^{\rm max} = \max_{d,\alpha,\beta} \left\{ \sum_{p} \left| C\left(N(\mathbf{W})_{p}\right) - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{100} C(N(d,\alpha,\beta,j)_{p})}{100} \right| \right\}$$

respectively.

Note that  $d_{\rm e}^{\rm min}$  and  $d_{\rm m}^{\rm min}$  minimalise the Euclidean distance and the Manhattan distance between the number of connected components of  $N(\mathbf{W})_p$  and the average number of connected components of  $N(d, \alpha, \beta, j)_p$ , respectively. Similarly,  $d_{\rm e}^{\rm max}$  and  $d_{\rm m}^{\rm max}$  maximalise these distances. Table 3 contains parameters  $d, \alpha$  and  $\beta$  of models for which these distances are the smallest. The sum

$$\sqrt{\sum_{p} \left( C\left(N(\mathbf{W})_{p}\right) - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{100} C(N(d, \alpha, \beta, j)_{p})}{100} \right)^{2}}$$

varies between  $d_{\rm e}^{\rm min} = 14.29699$  and  $d_{\rm e}^{\rm max} = 24.75912$ , whereas the sum

$$\sum_{p} \left| \mathcal{C}\left( N(\mathbf{W})_{p} \right) - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{100} \mathcal{C}\left( N(d, \alpha, \beta, j)_{p} \right)}{100} \right|$$

varies between  $d_{\rm m}^{\rm min} = 34.28$  and  $d_{\rm m}^{\rm max} = 75.02$ . In both cases best fitted models are those with parameter d = 1. Note that d = 1 means that  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$ , chosen during the procedure described in Section 4, satisfy  $\mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma_1\sigma_2^{-1}) \simeq N_{max}$ , therefore being almost revers permutations. This fact confirms the hypothesis that jurors of the 15<sup>th</sup> International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition were far away from being consistent.

#### 6. Conclusions and recommendations for further research

This section contains conclusions and open questions related to the subject of these studies.

The results of voting include a lot of information about preferences of voters and their structure. The application of network theory can highlight properties of networks constructed on the basis of jurors' votings. The obtained networks may be used to describe homogeneity or heterogeneity of jurors' votings.

During this research some questions arose.

Euclidean Distance	maximal value - 24.75912
$d = 1, \alpha = 0.4, \beta = 0.6$	14.29699
$d = 1, \alpha = 0.45, \beta = 0.55$	14.29773
$d = 1, \alpha = 0.5, \beta = 0.5$	14.30108
$d = 1, \alpha = 0.55, \beta = 0.45$	14.30696
$d = 1, \alpha = 0.6, \beta = 0.4$	14.30696
Manhattan Distance	maximal value - 75.02
$d = 1, \alpha = 0.1, \beta = 0.9$	34.28
$d = 1, \alpha = 0.15, \beta = 0.85$	34.32
$d = 1, \alpha = 0.85, \beta = 0.15$	34.32
$d = 1, \alpha = 0.9, \beta = 0.1$	34.4
$d = 0.9, \alpha = 0.1, \beta = 0.9$	34.78

Table 3. Best fitting parameters

- 1. How do statistical coefficients of networks  $N(d, \alpha, \beta, j)_p$  depend on d,  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ?
- 2. How does behaviour of generic networks depend on the number of jurors and the number of contestants?
- 3. What are the asymptotic (with number of jurors and/or contestants tending to  $\infty$ ) properties of generic networks?
- 4. How do best fitting parameters d,  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  change when increasing the number of repeats?
- 5. How will properties of generic networks change when we randomly choose permutation  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$  with  $\mathcal{LF}_2(\sigma_1\sigma_2^{-1})$  precisely set from all possible values of  $\mathcal{LF}_2$ ?

These questions are a good starting point for further research.

#### Acknowledgement

A preprint has previously been published, see [30] and [31]. All calculations and figures were prepared with R 4.0.3, see [25]. Both authors are grateful to anonymous reviewers, whose valuable remarks allowed to improve the paper. The second author is grateful to his wife for her strong and loving support as well as for her inspiring *"try to think nonstandard"*.

#### Funding

While working on this paper, the second author was partially supported by the SGH fund KAE/S21 and by the NCN fund UMO-2018/31/B/HS4/01005.

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